What Is the Secret World of Uta Stansburiana?

Uta stansburiana. A delightful little lizard from California. Why does it keep crossing my mind?

Well, I’ve recently delved into game theory for my scientific work. The theory itself is fascinating, and the examples, like the behavior of the Uta stansburiana lizard, add an interesting twist.

Researchers recently discovered that males of this species play a game similar to our paper-rock-scissors. According to Sinervo and Lively (1996), field data on the side-blotched lizard confirmed that the three male mating strategies cycle in a six-year rock-paper-scissors pattern. Each one is able to invade the population dominated by the previous one.

Honestly, I used to think such games were unique to humans. In nature, hierarchical systems usually prevail, where one strategy clearly overpowers another, often through force.

I assumed cyclic strategies, where each one is better than the last and worse than the next, were rare. But then, I learned otherwise.

What Are the Three Male Strategies?

For this species, male lizards fall into three categories. According to Gross (1996), such alternative reproductive tactics exist. These tactics, where distinct male strategies coexist within a single species, are a widespread evolutionary pattern rather than a rare exception.

The first group, with an orange dewlap, consists of aggressive males that compete for mates by attacking other males. The second group, with a yellow dewlap, resembles females.

This similarity prevents aggression from the orange males. Consequently, this allows the yellow males to mate with females while the orange males are distracted and unable to guard their mates effectively.

The third group, the blue males, succeed in securing a mate from the yellow males. They stay monogamous and protect a chosen female, outperforming the yellow males by stopping them from breeding with females.

However, they struggle against the orange males, who aggressively target any blue males and their mates. Interestingly, the proportions of these male types balance out over time, despite short-term changes.

This stability reflects a dynamic system in replicator dynamics. Furthermore, the even distribution of orange, yellow, and blue males represents a Nash equilibrium for mixed strategy dynamics—a stable evolutionary state.

According to Maynard Smith and Price (1973), evolutionarily stable strategies are behaviors that, once common in a population, cannot be outcompeted by any alternative strategy. Therefore, this is why nature often settles into a mix of strategies rather than a single dominant one.

How Does Game Theory Apply to Humans Like Uta Stansburiana 2.0?

I found myself intrigued by this tiny creature. Yet, its case led to deeper thoughts.

If I knew which strategy came last, I could understand which behavior is more advanced evolutionarily. I realized that mindless aggression and combat might be the most common and thoughtless behaviors among these strategies. This suggests that the orange strategy could have been the initial one.

The yellow strategy seems to be an evolutionary response to the orange one. Meanwhile, the blue strategy appears to bridge the gap between the previous two. My instincts suggest that the blue strategy might have emerged last.

What does this mean? Perhaps monogamy is the most advanced evolutionary invention, though mathematically comparable to the others.

However, unlike lizards, humans need more than just breeding opportunities; they require ongoing support. So, when considering monogamy for humans, additional qualities should be taken into account.

According to Henrich, Boyd, and Richerson (2012), societies that institutionalize monogamous marriage tend to show lower rates of crime, violence, and social inequality. These rates are lower compared to societies where polygyny is common.

How Do These Strategies Show Up in Humans?

Humans exhibit all these strategies. These include the confident, playful individual, the friend who provides comfort and occasional fun, and the honest, loyal person who avoids vague arrangements. There are likely even more strategies.

In any case, the evolutionarily stable strategy varies due to human spiritual needs. Many people value these faithful traits.

This strategy is socially desirable in developed areas. However, this contrasts with the orange strategy seen in parts of Africa and the Middle East, which causes disruption and rampant appropriation of female partners by the strongest. If prosperity thrives where this strategy dominates, there may be common principles at work.